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The Yangtze Incident. 28th July 1949
H.M.S. Concord Admiral, Sir, Patrick Brind.
On the date and at the time of Admiral, Sir, Patrick Brind, giving that order he committed H.M.S. Concord and the ships complement into a situation where the risk and rigour factor was significantly above that which might be routinely expected to be tolerated by UK Armed Forces personnel.
For sixty–two years now the true story of H.M.S. Amethyst’s dramatic escape from Chinas, Yangtze River has been suppressed, and further to that fact, via the Adm, documentation relating to the 1949 Yangtze Incident held at Kew, it can be established, that the HD Committee, responsible for compiling the 1949 Yangtze Campaign Awards System, ‘that committee’ was not invited to look into H.M.S. Concord’s role in the incident covering the dates, 28th to 31st July 1949. As such the 1949 ships complement of H.M.S. Concord, have remained for sixty-two years now the unrecognised heroes of the 1949 Yangtze Incident, victims of Governmental skulduggery.
To day in this present day and age there is within the Churchill College Archives, the Naval papers, signals and letters of Rear Admiral Sir David Scott, who was Lieutenant Flag Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, Admiral Brind, on-board H.M.S. Belfast, it was Scott, who devised and put together the coded signalling system that allowed Admiral Brind, to communicate with H.M.S. Amethyst and Concord, when he, Admiral, Brind, decided to authorise an endeavour to bring about H.M.S. Amethyst’s escape despite of the risk, as he put it in making a statement to the news media, following the escape event 31st July 1949.
Further, deposited within Kings College London, there is in abundance the newspaper cuttings appertaining to the event of Amethyst’s escape which Admiral, Brind, had retained, obviously for the importance of what the news media on the Far East Station had picked up on and was reporting, also deposited among that archived material there is the Top Secret plans, from the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station Singapore, dated 18th June 1949 that were being put together in preparation to defend Hong Kong, in the event of it being attacked by the Communists.
And also termed Top Secret is; AN APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION WHICH COULD RESULT FROM AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE NATIONALISTS CLOSURE OF SHANGHAI BY FORCE which is dated 23rd August, 1949
From the terms within those two documents dated 18th June 1949 and 23rd August 1949 an insight is provided into what the environmental “Risk and Rigour” factors amounted to on China’s River Yangtze.
Now in a letter dated 21st July 2011 that I have received from a Mr S. J. Spear, Naval Secretary (Honours and Awards) SO 1. He writes; “As you are aware, the Coalition set out its intention in the Programme for Government, published in May 2010, to review the rules governing the award of medals as part of its commitment to rebuild the military covenant. A draft medal review has now been completed by the Ministry of Defence but in order for the views of various campaign groups to be further considered by the review team, it was decided that extracts of the draft report should be circulated to campaign groups, including the HMS CONCORD veterans, along with an invitation to submit their comments. The closing date for responses from the campaign groups was 30 June, and I can confirm that the Ministry of Defence has received a number of responses. I can assure that the formal responses which the review team have received will be carefully considered, and any details of which they were not previously aware, will receive the appropriate attention.
It is important that the Department gets this right, and the review team will, of course, continue to conduct this part of the review with due diligence and propriety. The Minister and the Ministry of Defence do understand the strength of feeling behind CONCORD veterans’ claim that they should be eligible for the NGSM ‘Yangtze 1949’ clasp, but I hope you will understand that, at this stage, it would be inappropriate to comment on any conclusions the review may reach.”
NOTE: - (It is important that the department gets this right, and the review team will, of course, continue to conduct this part of the review with due diligence and Propriety.)
To-day’s date is 4th August 2011 sixty two years ago the Commander-in-Chief, on the Far East Station, Vice Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, went public, and informed the news media there that, it was he who decided to authorise an endeavour to bring about H.M.S. Amethyst’s escape from China’s Yangtze River, despite the risk.
Admiral Brind, in going public on what amounted to the covert mission, he authorised, obviously upset the British Diplomatic, apple-cart, in that following the success of the mission and H.M.S. Amethyst’s escape on the 31st July 1949, the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson, stationed at Nanking, sent out a telegram addressed to the Foreign Office, the C-in-C Far East Station, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai Embassy Office and Canton.
The telegram read; “(a) No repeat no publicity should be given to the fact that H.M.Ship Concord entered Chinese territorial waters.
(b) Amethyst in getting under way was forced to reply to fire directed at her by shore batteries. It should be stressed that she did so to the minimum necessary for self-protection.
(c) It might help to lesson the possibility of repercussions on British communities in Communists occupied territory if public statements could stress that the escape of H.M.Ship Amethyst was due to the initiative of the officer in command in accordance with the best traditions of a sailor responsible for the safety of his ship and the welfare of the ships company and that his intention to do so was not revealed to any of us out here. As the Communists have refused to deal with H.M. Embassy in the matter which they have, in fact, insisted upon treating as a local issue for discussion between P.L.A. and the R.N., such a statement on our part is logical and cannot repeat harm persons concerned.”
That telegram is just one of the many items relative to establishing a true and accurate account of H.M.S. Concord’s role in the 1949 Yangtze Campaign, which Rear Admiral Sir David Scott, deposited within the Churchill College Archives, prior to his demise. I shall be posting a copy of that telegram elsewhere in this correspondence
There is also among the collection of newspaper cuttings that were held by Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, documents which were classified, as being, Secret, in 1949, the written terms were within those documents, deposited within Kings College Archives. London, also provide an overwhelming insight into the environmental risk and rigour factors that ships compliment of H.M.S. Concord, were being subjected to when ordered into the Yangtze River, in July 1949.
On Thursday 4th August 2011 during a telephone conversation with Mr S. J. Spear, Naval Secretary, (Honours and Awards) SO 1. He intimated to me that the archived documents of both Admiral Sir Patrick Brind and Rear Admiral Sir David Scott are not germane.
Not germane! Note, in February, 20th 2008, Mr J. S Spear, in a letter reference: - D/NAVSEC(H&A)1760/4/4/9 wrote the following in the last paragraph of that correspondence; “All the available evidence indicates that HMS AMETHYST had reached the vicinity of Woosung when she met HMS CONCORD proceeding up river to provide support and assistance. It is not considered inappropriate to describe Woosung as being at the mouth of the river, for example see the enclosed map. But in terms of considering HMS CONCORD’s eligibility for the NGSM clasp the ship’s exact position in the river would not have been material. The fact remains that, with the benefit of the hindsight available when the institution of the clasp was being considered, by the time the two ships met. HMS AMETHYST had escaped her incarceration. From that point, neither HMS AMETHYST nor HMS CONCORD was fired upon, and neither was subject to the extremes of risk and rigour that British Medals are intended to represent.”
The above, I will return to, as that which I am about to quote come from a newspaper article headed ‘The Full Facts’ it is just one of the items that was retained by Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, and after his demise it was eventually, deposited within Kings College Archives, London.
From the article I now quote; * “During the three months in which the Amethyst was detained she was allowed to buy fresh vegetables from local contractors, but supplies were scarce. A small consignment of fuel and stores was allowed to reach her, but in July she was getting desperately short. There seemed no prospect of the replenishments awaiting her at Shanghai ever being allowed to reach the ship in spite of repeated requests. As a result of this deadlock, I decided to authorise an endeavour to escape, in spite of the risk.” * Unquote.
With that shown, I now return to the paragraph of Mr S. J. Spear’s communication where he is seen to be stating; “From that point, neither HMS AMETHYST nor HMS CONCORD was fired upon, and neither was subjected to the extremes of risk and rigour that British Medals are intended to represent.”
Well for the benefit of all reading this, the following was written into a ‘Review of records pertaining to the institution of the Clasp and eligibility of HMS CONCORD’ the Review amounts to seven pages in total and was compiled by the Naval Secretary (Honours & Awards) S01 he in turn delivered it into the hands of Mr Andrew Robathan, MP. Minister for Defence Personnel. Welfare and Veterans, who in turn submitted the same to the Scottish Parliaments Public Petitions Committee that were dealing with Public Petition numbered 1312 Now, back to the spoken words of Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, as was reported by the news media on the Far East Station, “As a result of this deadlock, I decided to authorise an endeavour to escape, in spite of the risk.” and here is what the individual purporting to be the Naval Secretary (Honours & Awards) S01 wrote in his communication dated 28th February 2008 ref: D/NAVSEC(H&A) 1760/4/4/9 “The fact remains that, with the benefit of the hindsight available when the institution of the clasp was being considered, by the time the two ships met, HMS AMETHYST had escaped her incarceration. From that point, neither HMS AMETHYST nor HMS CONCORD was fired upon, and neither was subjected to the extremes of risk and rigour that the British Medals are intended to represent.” Here now, for its importance is a little item that was inserted into the statement compiled within the Cabinet on the 25th April 1949 and thereafter, read out to the House of Lords by The First Lord Of The Admiralty (Viscount Hall) on the 26th April 1949, and the same statement was read out to all assembled within the House of Commons by Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, on the same date, 26th April 1949. The item that was inserted, for its terms, and importance, I now quote; * “The House will wish to have a full account of the circumstances in which His Majesty’s ships were fired upon in the Yangtze River with grievous casualties and damage. I will first explain what our position is with regard to the civil war in China. It has been repeatedly stated in this House that our policy has been governed by the Moscow Declaration of December, 1945, in which the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union declared a policy of Non-intervention in China’s internal affairs.”* Unquote. When and at the time of The First Lord Of The Admiralty (Viscount Hall) and Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, were making the overall statement within the House of Lords and the House of Commons, it was within the knowledge of both of them, that facts relative to and relating to the Yangtze Incident, of 20th and 21st April 1949 were being wrongfully excluded from both the House of Lords and the House of Commons in order to disallow questions. (That which was a Secret Cabinet Paper headed, G.P. (49) COPY NO 3125 APRIL titled CABINET SITUATION IN CHINA Memorandum by Foreign Secretary And First Seal Lord of the Admiralty. can establish those facts.) There for all to see is a sample of how business was being conducted within the House of Lords and the House of Commons on 26th April 1949, concerning the Yangtze Incident. Then on the 1st November 1949 four months after H.M.S. Amethyst’s escape from the Yangtze River 31st July 1949 having been assisted by H.M.S. Concord, the following matter was raised within the House of Commons, from (Hansard, 1 November 1949) YANGTZE OPERATIONS (MEDAL) I quote; * “Commander Noble asked the Prime Minister whether approval has been given for the issue of a General Service Medal for service in operations on the River Yangtze earlier this year. The Prime Minister (Mr Attlee) Yes, Sir, His Majesty has approved proposals for the grant of the Naval General Service Medal for specified service on the River Yangtze between 20th April and 31st July, 1949. A short White paper on the subject is available in the Vote Office.”* Unquote. In quoting such, I have taken the liberty of underscoring several words in order to emphasise the terms within the question being asked, and the reply to the same. (No where on that short White paper which Attlee, referred to as being available in the Vote Office, was or is there any mention of H.M.S. Concord’s, service in the River Yangtze, 28th to 31st July 1949, a fact that tell’s us all, that Prim Minister, Attlee, who was aware of H.M.S. Concord’s operative role in the Yangtze Incident, deliberately withheld that information from those within the House of commons and therefore ultimately from His Majesty. Next, Within the Foreign Office
Files For China, 1949-1976 (Public Record Office Classes F… There are 6
files on Formosa/Taiwan. Naval Secretary (Honours & Awards) S01, in your communication of 20th February 2008 Ref: D/NAVSEC(H&A)1760/4/4/9, which I’ve referred to, when you enclosed that, which you referred to, as a copy of a map taken from the book titled “Hostage on the Yangtze. Britain, China, and the Amethyst Crisis of 1949” Malcolm H Murfett, 1991. That which you refer to, as a map was a sketch, something which is vastly different from a map or a chart but you chose to use it for the devious purpose of your inference which was, “It is not considered inappropriate to describe Woosung as being at the mouth of the river” The terms within that brief sentence, tends to show the petard you hoist by in the application of diligence and propriety. By the way Mr, Naval Secretary
(Honours & Awards) S01, it did not escape my notice that, when you wrote
the letter being referred to above you also quoted in that letter what Mr
Bob Ainsworth MP, had written to Mr Jim Devine, MP, which was as follows;
“By the time HMS Amethyst reached HMS CONCORD’s position at the mouth of
the river Yangtze on the morning of 31st July 1949, she had
succeeded in making her escape. As the copy of HMS CONCORD’s log provided
by Mr Leitch indicates HMS CONCORD’s people had been ‘closed up’ at Action
Stations between 0402 and 0715. Now Mr, Naval Secretary, that which I am about to quote was written by you while compiling that, deemed to be a Review, of the records pertaining to the institution of the Clasp and eligibility of H.M.S. Concord, I quote; * “Examination of T300/71 shows that the HD Committee were not invited to consider whether HMS CONCORD should be included as one of the units whose personnel would be eligible for the medal this is central to the veterans’ claim that HMS CONCORD’s part in HMS AMETHYST’s escape on the night of 30/31 July 1949 was deliberately covered up and that the alleged cover up led to HMS CONCORD being omitted from the list of units that were specified as qualifying for the medal.” * Unquote. Then at item numbered 12 on pages four of the ‘Review’ you write the following, which I quote for its terms therein; * “This allegation is not sustainable. As the HD Papers show, eligibility for the medal was based on actual risk and rigour experienced by those ships and units that were involved in the actions on 20 and 21 April 1949, and in recognition of HMS AMETHYST’s incarceration in the river between 20 April and 31 July 12949. It is a matter of historical fact in accounts of HMS AMETHYST’s escape down river on the night of 30/31 July when she was met by HMS CONCORD early in the morning of 31 July, that HMS CONCORD was not subjected to the same degree of actual risk and rigour as that which the other ships and units had experienced in April 1949. In fairness, this has never been alleged.” * Unquote. For your information Mr Naval Secretary, and that of others, when upon the dates 20th and 21st April 1949, Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Vice Admiral Madden, gave the orders that caused and brought about the movement and involvement of H.M.S. Consort, London and Black Swan, within the River Yangtze, there was no risk of those ships striking under water mines as laying of mines in the Yangtze River was brought into practice by the Chinese Nationalists, following the fall of Shanghai in April 1949. Now, when the Naval Secretary (Honours & Awards) S01, compiled the ‘Review’ that was distained to be placed before the Scottish Parliaments Public Petitions Committee, he wrote as a de-note that which I am about to quote; * “Public Record” is taken to mean contemporary official government records available in the national archives as well as other reference sources available in the public domain. As the veterans have pointed out, material alluding to the Yangtze Incident either wholly or in part has also been deposited in other Archives and research institutes over the years. The Yangtze Incident has been the subject of numerous published books and other accounts, including at least one feature film. The accuracy of these accounts depends, of course, on the thoroughness of the research or the intended audience. One of these books, “Hostage on the Yangtze; Britain, China, and the Amethyst Crisis of 1949”, Malcolm H MURFETT, 1991 has been used as a source of general background to the incident. MURFETT’s book contains an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary reference sources.” *Unquote. Yes indeed, the Yangtze Incident has been the subject of numerous published books, just as it has been a subject raised and referred to within the publications of others who were eyewitnesses to the event. For instance there is Gren Wedderburns, publication titled “No Lotus Garden” (1987) ISBN 0 946270 37 6. Within Dr Wedderburn’s, autobiography there is a chapter titled Amethyst and Consort, which begins at page 46, the chapter amounts to seven pages in total, within those pages he provides the readers with an account of what he and the pilot of the US Air Force B-25, known in the R.A.F. as a Mitchell, witnessed while flying over the River Yangtze, as part of the flight plan to get Doctor Wedderburn, to Nanking Airport. From that chapter I purposely quote
the following for its terms therein; * “The
Mitchell braked to a stop in front of the control tower at the empty
Nanking Airport. As I shook hands with the pilot he said to me. “Well, you
and I are the only guy’s around who have ever seen that sight and I reckon
we are the only ones who ever will.” Now for the information of all; following three valiant efforts made by Consort to take Amethyst in tow from where she lay grounded on Rose Island, Consort, severely damaged, with ten dead and a great many injured had to retire, and in doing so proceeded down river, towards Kiang Yin, where at 1900 hours on the 20 April 1949 H.M.S. London, within the vicinity of several Chinese Nationalists Warships, dropped anchor. It was then that H.M.S. Consort, went alongside of the London, for emergency repairs to the ship and the transfer of some of the seriously wounded for medical attention. It was also then, that the Captain of H.M.S. Consort and Black Swan were summoned aboard the London, for a conference with Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station, Admiral, A.C.G. Madden. At 0930 hrs, on the 21st April 1949, Madden, informed, John Hodges, acting Captain, for Captain. Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station, that he intended that London should attempt the passage of the Yangtze to Rose Island with the object of escorting Amethyst down river. That information can be found within the report of Commander John Hodges dated 28th April 1949 the report is numbered 221/139 but, no-where, within the over-all report is there any reference to the Communists having started to cross the Yangtze some twenty- four hours before the expiry of the armistice. ‘Yet’ that information was the topic of discussion within the naval office of the British Embassy, at Nanking, where and when it was decided to abandon an attempt to get Dr Wedderburn, and a truck loaded with medical supplies and instrument to reach Amethyst. In pointing out that there was no mention of such, within the report of Commander John Hodges dated 28th April 1949 the same is applicable to the statement that was drawn up, within the Cabinet Office, on the 25th April 1949, in order to be presented to the House of Lords and the House of Commons, in oral fashion on 26th April 1949. Commander, John Hodges, does however mention in his report that the casualties on-board the London, amounted to, thirteen killed, fourteen seriously wounded and 40 wounded. Now I am again returning to H.M.S. Concord’s, role in the Yangtze Incident, and being produced below is a photograph of H.M.S Amethyst, the photograph was taken from on-board H.M.S. Concord, at 1155 hour when Amethyst, dropped anchor in the River Yangtze, in preparation to receive H.M.S. Concord, alongside. For the record, between the hours of 0815 and 0840 on the 31st July 1949. Two attempts to remain alongside Amethyst anchored in position 1 Mile East of L.V. were unsuccessful due to tide on the river, and at the time, those matters were recorded in the ships log of H.M.S. Concord. Captured in that photograph, of Amethyst, is the union flag that was upon one of the orders given by the ships Captain, on the 20th April 1949 un-furled over the ships side, was at the time when shots were fired over and around the Amethyst, without causing damage to the ship or injury to those on-board, ‘a fact omitted, from the prepared statements appertaining to the incident, which were read out within the House of Lords and the House of Commons 26th April 1949. Also captured in that photograph is the irrefutable evidence which establishes that absence of H.M.S. Amethyst’s secondary armament the orlikons, by looking above the rating wearing white shorts who is holding a fender in position down the ships side. Directly above that rating is an area termed the ships wing, and seen protruding above the wing is the orlikon gun mounting, (minus the gun). The following photograph of H.M.S Concord and Amethyst, alongside of each other was taken at the nautical position, (30° -40° N, (20° 45° E, on the Yangtze River, the photograph was taken from on-board H.M.S. Concord, at 1200 hrs on the 31st July 1949. If you look closely at X gun, on H.M.S. Amethyst, it can be seen that the gun muzzle tampons are firmly secured in the muzzles on both barrels, and both of the gun layer and trainers hatches are closed, make of that what you will. .
Then at 1800 hours, Lieutenant T.J.D. Grant RN, along with the very efficient Signalman, Eldridge and Telegraphst, Charlie Cox, they were transferred from H.M.S Concord, to H.M.S. Amethyst, on temporary loan. H.M.S. Concord’s log will establish those facts, however, not noted as an item within the log is the fact that a ‘steaming crew of stokers’ from H.M.S. Concord, were also transferred on to H.M.S. Amethyst on temporary loan, but when taking into account that H.M.S. Concord’s ships log was taken out of commission as part an parcel of a plot, to conceal what amounted to the ship having successfully completed its mission, a mission which was authorised by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station Admiral, Sir. Patrick Brind, in his endeavour to bring about the successful escape of H.M.S. Amethyst, in spite of risk. Next, being posted below, in two enlarged parts are copy’s of the telegram, which I have already referred to as having been sent out by H.M Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson, who at the time was stationed at Nanking. Here I wish to point out that also among the naval papers of Rear Admiral Sir David Scott, deposited within the Churchill College Archive. Cambridge, are the letters which he wrote home to his father who by rank was an Admiral. Within that correspondence he is seen to be providing his parent with an elaborate and descriptive account of the (Amethyst Incident 30th and 31st July 1949).
There for all to see is a copy of the telegram that shows, Sir Ralph Stevenson, the British Ambassador, promoting a no publicity policy, to the fact that H.M.Ship Concord, had been ordered to enter Chinese territorial waters on the 28th July 1949 for the purpose of taking part in the endeavour authorised by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station to bring about H.M.S. Amethyst’s escape and rescue, in spite of risk. In a letter that I received from, Mr S.J. Spear, Naval Secretary (Honours & Awards) S01, dated 6th June 2011 ref: D/NASEC(H&A) 1760/4/4/9 he writes within the concluding paragraph, the which I now quote; * “It is also a matter of record that when HMS AMETHYST ultimately did make her escape, HMS CONCORD was not subjected to the circumstances of April 1949, nor to the circumstances of HMS AMETHYST’s enforced incarceration in the river, which the contemporary medal records show that the ‘Yangtze 1949’ clasp was specifically instituted to recognise.” *Unquote. There is a sample of the garbage that this flunky to the MoD, with the given credentials, Naval Secretary (Honours & Awards) S01 dreams up, he is the same flunky who wrote the letter dated 21st July 2011, which is referred to in the second page of this correspondence, a letter of sorts, in which he has the audacity infer: “It is important that the Department gets this right, and the review team will, of course, with due diligence and Propriety.” Well Flunky, read into this: (1).
When on the 20th April 1949 Madden, Second-in-Command, Far East
Station, ordered H.M.S. Consort, to go to Amethyst’s assistance, Consort,
was severely damaged, ratings were killed and seriously wounded, and
wounded. the British populace residing at Nanking were minus their guard
ship! (2). When at 0930 hrs on the 21st April 1949 Madden, decided that H.M.S. London, and Black Swan should attempt passage of the Yangtze to Rose Island with the object of escorting Amethyst down river, the end result of that decision was, the London, was severely damaged, thirteen ratings were dead, fourteen were severely wounded and forty wounded. The Black Swan, was damaged, no ratings were killed but several were wounded. Neither of those ships got to within the distance of twenty nautical miles of Amethyst. (3). Whether the naval attachés office within the British Embassy, informed Admiral, Madden, on-board the London, that the Communists had started to cross the Yangtze some twenty-four hours before the expiry of the armistice. ‘A very large question mark has to hang over that fact’ as within the Report of Commander John Hodges, of H.M.S. London, dated 28th April 1949 at item 5. He writes; “It was perfectly clear to both the Admiral and myself that the passage of the river against the opposition of determined and well trained shore batteries was not a feasible operation: we considered that against light and sporadic opposition it was a reasonable proposition and hoped that there would be no opposition at all. I was agreed that if fire were opened on the ship she would reply in self defence with all guns.” Note: For quite some time prior to the Yangtze Incident occurring, 20th April 1949, there was, in place, Admiralty Standing Orders, that were to the effect, that all British Warship making passage on the Yangtze river, those ships would remain at the stood to position, in order to respond if fired upon from the north bank of the river, in a defensive action only.
To-day in this present day and age 62 years on in time from when the Yangtze Incident, of 1949 occurred, question marks still hang over how such an incident could have occurred, at a time when this nation was at peace, and why was H.M.S. Concord, not recognised in the British Medal Awards System, for its role in the Yangtze Incident, 28th to 31st July 1949.
Again, to day in this day and age 62 years on from the time of the 1949 Yangtze Incident, we have a Mr S.J. Spear, Naval Secretary (Honours and Awards) S01 writing to various campaign groups reminding them, that Prime Minister, Cameron’s, Coalition set out its intention in the Programme for Government, published in May 2010, to review the rules governing the awards of medals as part of its commitment to rebuild the military covenant. In doing so, Mr Spears, intimated, that it was decided that extracts of the report should be circulated to campaign groups, including the HMS CONCORD veterans, along with an invitation to submit their comments.
Prime Minister, Cameron, Colonel Woyka, for your information and that of others, there is within the Royal Navy Establishment, at H.M.S. Collingwood, a set up that consists of four ships Bridge Training Navigation Simulators, upon becoming functional each of those simulated ships bridges were independently provided with a name, the names being Amethyst, Consort, London and Black Swan the names of the four ships involved in the Yangtze Incident, 20th and 21st April 1949.
Although the Navigational Simulator Unit is very much Amethyst, orientated, as a result of Amethyst, memorabilia decorating walls within the unit, that does not detract from the technological capabilities of those simulators which are capable of producing a reproduction of the 1949 Yangtze Incident, based upon the wealth of information that is now, readily available, in this day and age. Yours Sincerely, William Leitch.
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