RESPONSE
Public Petition PE1312.
22/02/2011

Madam Convener,

Members of the Scottish Parliament, Public Petition’s Committee, as you will all no doubt be aware I have posted on my website the video-recorded proceedings relating to the Scottish Parliament Public Petition, numbered 1312 that took place within the Scottish Parliament, 22/02/2011. (See the link titled, ‘PETITION LATEST’ on the Website: http://www.thehmsconsort.co.uk

For The Record: Since the time of PETITION Number 1312 being formally lodged with the Scottish Parliament on the 21^st February 2010. Item 3 of the Petition text has shown that I as the Petitioner, called upon the Scottish Parliament to urge the Scottish Government to make representations to the UK Government asking it to investigate circumstances into the process for awarding medals to those involved in the 1949 Yangtze campaign and, in particular, whether this process was corrupted as a result of the exclusion of relevant and important documents relating to the role of H.M.S. Concord in the Yangtze Campaign on 30 and 31 July 1949.

No-where, within that text did I make any reference to the qualifying criteria that is applicable to the ‘1949 Yangtze Campaign Awards System. The question, in particular, being asked was, whether this process was corrupted as a result of the exclusion of relevant and important documents relating to the role of H.M.S. Concord in the Yangtze Campaign on 30 and 31 July 1949.  

Now, on the 15^th June 2010 as we all know a junior minister within the newly elected UK Government’s, Ministry of Defence Offices, a Mr Andrew Robathan, MP wrote in reply to Alex Neil MSP’s correspondence of 18^th March 2010.

From the terms within Mr Robathan’s communication dated 15^th June 2010, I quote; * “As a result of the petition and the concerns that have been raised by naval veterans over a number of years, a review has been conducted by the Department into the institution of the ‘Yangtze 1949’ clasp to the NGSM. I enclose a copy. 

You will see from this that, quite apart from the long standing Government position of successive administrations that no consideration can be given to reviewing medals that were instituted many years previously, there appears to be clear reason why HMS Concord was not included in the list of ships and units that are eligible for the clasp therefore see no grounds for reversing that decision. I recognise that this will be a disappointment for the veterans concerned; but this does not, of course, detract from CONCORD’S service on the night of 30/31^st July 1949 or the respect in which her crew deserve to be held.” * Unquote.  

Madam Convener, Committee Members: Where Mr Robathan, in his letter writes; ‘As a result of the petition and the concerns that have been raised by naval veterans over a number of years, a review has been conducted by the Department into the institution of the ‘Yangtze 1949’ clasp to the NGSM. I enclose a copy.

That Review, which was enclosed, was put together by a Mr S J Spear, Naval Secretary (Honours and Awards) SO1 who works within Fleet Headquarters, Leach Building (MP3.1 Whale Island, Portsmouth. PO2 8BY  

There you have the source which Mr Robathan, deems to be the “Department” that compiled the Review into the institution of the ‘Yangtze 1949 clasp to the NGSM. and its been to this same source that successive administration have been passing-the-buck onto where naval veterans who served on-board H.M.S. Concord, raised there concerns regarding the ‘Yangtze 1949’ clasp to the NGSM.

Next, where in the last paragraph of Mr Robathan’s letter of the 15^th June 2010 there is an inference being made that I would draw to the Committee’s attention to by underscoring in quoting; * “there appears to be a clear reason why HMS CONCORD was not included in the list of ships and units that are eligible for the clasp therefore see no grounds for reversing the decision.” * Unquote. In writing such, he does not define, what to him, is clear reasoning!  Could it be, the no risk and rigour card, that’s being played?

On the first page of the Review under, the title; “The 1949 Yangtze Incident” at item numbered 1 there are five dots that are more or less denoting five separate items at the fifth dot is the following information is being provided; “30/31 July. HMS AMETHYST made her escape down river where, in the morning of 31 July, she met HMS CONCORD sent up river earlier that morning to offer assistance if required. Both ships subsequently reached safety seemingly without being recognised and without having had to go into action.” 

Below that. Under the word Notes, at note numbered 3 the following is written; “HMS CONCORD had entered the Yangtze river very early on the morning of 31 July to be on hand to assist AMETHYST by providing gunfire support if the Chinese fort on the river bank at Woosung attempted to interfere with AMETHYST’s escape. In the event, by the time AMETHYST reached CONCORD, the Woosung fort had seemingly failed to detect the two ships and AMETHYST had, to all intents and purpose successfully made her escape in that, after that point it appears that there was little the Communist Chinese, could have done to impede the passage to open sea. It has been suggested that mobile Chinese artillery batteries were deployed on the river bank further downstream and that the two ships remained at risk during their passage downstream beyond Woosung. Whether this can be verified is not known but as with the fort at Woosung, the ships do not seem to have been detected or at least were not engaged at anytime before they reached safety.”  

Well, at the time of writing up, that item, within the Review, the Naval Secretary (Honours an Awards) SO1 had within his possession, a copy of a Confidential Operational Priority Signal, that originated from no lesser a source than the C-in-C Afloat, a signal that had been sent to H.M.S. Concord, and read, “My 301801 stop no recent intelligence of batteries, they used to extend intermittently from Woosung to Keutoan beacon. Woosung has heavy guns.”  Again, at the time of compiling the Review, the Naval Secretary, SO1 by privilege, and position, was aware of the terms with that signal.

 For the Record, and as can be established from the ships log of H.M.S Concord, July 1949 starting:  July 27.  0900 sailed from Hong Kong with COSSACK, COMUS and CONSTANCE. Night exercises with JAMAICA. 2200 Detached by Capt D8 to act independently.
July 28    in Yangtze Entrance.   
July 29    0555 Hoisted White Ensigns at both at both yard arms. 0315 Duty part of the watch employed in getting up ammunition. 2000   ½ hrs notice for steam.  
July 30    0015 Reverted to 2 hrs notice for steam.                                                          
               740        Gun crews at drill.
               2125  10 min notice for steam
               0013  Anchises passed ahead 7 cables under tow by Caroline Muller

From that brief account, taken from H.M.S Concord’s log it becomes obvious, that Concord had been assigned to assist in Amethyst’s escape several days prior to the actual escape-taking place.

Further, among the copies of the signals which the Naval Secretary, (Honours and Awards) SO1 had access to at the time Review being compiled there was a copy of the C-in-C’s, signal to CONCORD that read, “IF YOU SEE ANCHISES AND CAROLINE MULLER TELL THEM TO GO DOWN RIVER AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.”                                        

Next, on page one of the Review, under the heading, The Institution of the ‘Yangtze 1949’ clasp to the NGSM, item numbered 2 shows; “The institution of a medal is an administrative process albeit one predicted on the requirement to recognise operational activity. In brief, the Commander-in-Chief in a theatre of operations, almost certainly partly guided by precedent, will make a submission, that the risk and rigour faced by personnel under command should be recognised by the institution of medalic recognition.”   (There is a footnote to this numbered 2, which I will return to, later, for its terms therein.)

Continuing now, on to page two of the Review, where it’s related; “ British campaign and operational service medals are a part of the UK’s national system of Honours and Awards and Medals. Whilst they may be proposed by the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence (or predecessor Departments), their institution is not the sole prerogative of the Armed Forces or the MOD. Only the Sovereign can approve the institution of a medal. Since the Second World War, at least, the Sovereign’s approval has been sought by the HD Committee. Today the Committee operates under the auspices of the Cabinet Office, but in 1949 the HD Committee was administered by the Treasury.”  

Then at Items Numbered 11 and 12 of the Review, the following is written; “Examination of T300/71 shows that the HD Committee were not invited to consider whether HMS CONCORD should be included as one of the units whose personnel would be eligible for the medal. This is central to the veterans claim that HMS CONCORD’s part in HMS AMETHYST’s escape on the night of 30/31 July 1949 was deliberately covered up and that this alleged cover up led to HMS CONCORD being omitted from the list of units that were specified as qualifying for the medal.”

12. “This allegation is not sustainable. As the HD papers show, eligibility for the medal was based on the actual risk and rigour experienced by those ships and units that were involved in the actions on 20 and 21 April 1949. It is a matter of historical fact in accounts of HMS AMETHYST’s down river on the night of 30/31 July 1949 when she was met by HMS CONCORD early in the morning of 31 July, that HMS CONCORD was not subjected to the same degree of actual risk and rigour as that which the other ships and units had experienced in April 1949. In fairness, this has never been alleged.”

There you have within item 12 the imputations of the Naval Secretary (Honours and Awards) SO1 the individual responsible for compiling the Review, and it is here that I now return to footnote numbered 2 referred to above for its terms therein, the terms, I now quote; * “Risk and Rigour” is an imprecise term but one that is used by medal administrative authorities to define the risk to life and limb exerted by enemy forces as well as the environmental rigour and exigencies of Service life on operations where this is assed to be significantly above that which might be routinely expected to be tolerated by the UK Armed forces personnel. British campaign and operational service medals are not intended to be a record of service. A proposal that medalic recognition should be instituted requires its own statement of the risk and rigour involved in the specific operation.” * Unquote.

 From within item 2 of the Review, it is being made specifically clear that, the Commander-in-Chief in a theatre of operations, almost certainly partly guided by precedent, will make a submission that the risk and rigour faced by personnel under command should be recognised by the institution of medalic recognition, but as item 11 of the Review, shows, we are all being informed to the effect that; Examination of T300/71 shows that the HD Committee were not invited to consider whether HMS CONCORD should be included as one of the units whose personnel would be eligible for the medal.

I don’t think there is any need on my part to add to what is being made clear to us all, from that prolific statement. As for that being put forward within item of the Review, and is quoted above on this page, the following paraphrase; ‘It is a matter of historical fact’ is being used to propound upon a Risk and Rigour, claim and in so doing concludes the item with the following inference; ‘In fairness, this has never been alleged.
Well, by ‘Fair Retort’ here is a matter of historical fact, in the form of part of a press release, by Admiral, Sir Patrick Brind, C-in-C Far East Station July 1949.

From the statement I quote; * “During the three months in which the Amethyst was detained she was allowed to buy fresh vegetables from local contractors but supplies were scarce. A small consignment of fuel and stores was allowed to reach her, but in July she was getting desperately short. There seemed no prospect of the replenishments awaiting her at Shanghai ever being allowed to reach the ship in spite of the repeated requests. As a result of this deadlock I decided to authorise an endeavour to escape, in spite of the risk.” * Unquote.

Provided on page two of this Response, there is an exert from the log of H.M.S. Concord, from the dates, times and terms logged, those items provide us with an insight into role of H.M.S. Concord, in the operation, that was authorised by, Admiral Brind, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, to bring about Amethyst’s escape, in spite of the risk.  

Within item 12 of the Review, which I’ve already referred to, a Review compiled by the Naval Secretary (Honours and Awards) SO1, he is seen to infer; “It is a matter of historical fact in accounts of HMS AMETHYST’s escape down river on the night of 30/31 July when she was met by HMS CONCORD early in the morning of 31 July, that HMS CONCORD was not subjected to the same degree of actual risk and rigour as that which the other ships and units had experienced.”  Well, as can be seen the Naval Secretary, (Honours and Awards) SO1 fails, to provide the source or location where any ‘historical fact, in accounts’ come anywhere near to establishing that H.M.S. Concord, was not subjected to the same degree of actual risk and rigour as that which other ships and units had experienced.

However, from historical facts and accounts it is possible to provide, the true account of the risk and rigour factor to which H.M.S. Concord’s ships complement, were subjected, as a result of the operation, authorised by Admiral Brind, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station. 

Within the Foreign Office Files For China, 1949-1967 there is a total of 11 files that cover the Yangtze Incident from 20^th April 1949. Further files document the Chinese Nationalist Governments blockade of ports under communist control and the closure of Chinese territorial waters up to 12 miles. And, of course, also covered is the laying of mines, by Nationalist’s, off port entrances on the River Yangtze, here I wish to point out that; Examination of the Naval Secretary (Honours and Awards) SO1 shows that the Scottish Parliaments Public Petitions Committee were not invited to consider accessing those files!

By assessment those files are capable establishing the sentimental rigour and exigencies of Service life on operations where it is assessed to be significantly above that which might be routinely expected to be tolerated by UK Armed Forces personnel. 

Just recently, I managed to trace and secure copies of the archived naval papers, documents and newspaper cuttings, of Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station. Among those papers there is this little gem of information that reads as follows; “Admiral Madden, who spent a sleepless night, requested Concord to take immediate charge of Amethyst. “After she has taken on board fuel, provisions and personnel from Concord, the object is to get her to Hong Kong as soon as possible,” he radioed Concord

Here also is a sample of what the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, Admiral Sir Patrick Brind’s archived, papers cover; Official Report on the blockade of Shanghai and British inability to defend Hong Kong from future attacks by Chinese Communist forces 1949. 

Press cuttings relating to the blockade of H.M.S. Amethyst in the Yangtze River, China, and Brind’s order as Commander-in-Chief, Far Eastern Fleet, for the successful break out of Amethyst, 1949.

By clicking on the link being provided, the Review being referred to can be read for its terms therein, being that, the Petitions Submissions via the link are within the public’s domain: - http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/petitionsubmissions/sub-10/10-PE1312e.pdf

As can and will be noticed, nowhere within that Review, is there any reference to or of Rear Admiral, Sir David Scott’s naval papers, writings and naval signals, covering the Amethyst Incident, 30^th and 31^st July 1949. (All material) which Rear Admiral Sir David Scott, deposited within the Churchhill College, Archives, himself. (Documentation that was within the knowledge of the Naval Secretary SO1, and was brought to his attention via a Command by Her Majesty The Queen.)

Among that archived material which establishes H.M.S. Concord’s role as a unit involved in the ‘1949 Yangtze Campaign’ there is also the, Telegram of the British Ambassador dated 31^st July 1949 with its terms therein, that may well have been responsible for H.M. Concord, having been wrongfully excluded from the ‘1949 Yangtze Awards System’ those terms being; “ No, Repeat, no publicity should be given to the fact that H.M.Ship. Concord entered Chinese territorial waters.”

Now via this link: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/85/43/Chinaguide.pdf you can find the following information: -
Brind. Adm Sir (Eric James Patrick. (189292- 1963)
Captain, HMS BIRMINGHAM, 5 Cruiser Sqn, China. 1938-1939; Commander-in-Chief, far East Station, HMS TERROR, 1949-1951. Letters home from Far East. 1949, official report on blockade of Shanghai and British inability to defend Hong Kong from possible future attack by Chinese Communist forces, 1949; newspaper cuttings relating to the attack on HMS AMETHYST Yangtze River, China 1949, and Brind’s order, as Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, for AMETHYST’, subsequent break out and escape.

Madam Convener, Committee Members and Committee Secretary

*************************************************************************************

The Chairman of the H.M.S. Concord Association (Peter Lee-Hale, Chartered FCIPD) and the members of the 1949 Commission of H.M.S. Concord wish to place on record their gratitude and appreciation for the support given to them by the Scottish Parliament in their quest to obtain justice in their claim for recognition of the role played by the 1949 commission of H.M.S. Concord in the escape of H.M.S. Amethyst 31^st July 1949 from incarceration by the Chinese Communists in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River.

Here, I also wish to accord my thanks and appreciation to all who have been supportive of this campaign.
                Sincerely,
                William Leitch.
                 Petitioner.

This Below, Is A Word Verbatim Reproduction
Of What Was A Secret Document

                                                                                             Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
                                                                                                            Far East Station,
                                                                                                                 Singapore. 

                                                                                                             18^th June, 1949

SECRET.
LANDING CRAFT AT HONG. 

        It is considered that a strong case can be made for the provision of landing craft to assist in the defence of Hong Kong.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.  

2.      If the Communists attack Hong Kong in force they will have the advantage of numbers and, to some extent, of battle experience.   The poor and few roads in the NEW TERRITORIES and the small area available tend to nullify the advantage of mobility that we could otherwise be expected to possess.

3.      On our side we have the following advantages which must be exploited to the full: -

(a)    Superior fighting qualities.
(b)    Technical superiority of all arms.
(c)    Probably command of the air.
(d)   Undisputed command of the sea. 

4.      With regard to (d) we should be able to supply, reinforce or evacuate HONG KONG up to the last moment but command of the sea will also give us the ability to fight the land battle with more mobility and economy than would otherwise be the case.  We should not deny ourselves this advantage, which is to be had for the asking.  In order  to move troops from one point to another by sea, landing craft are essential, there being many good beaches but practically no jetties. 

5.      In case it should be necessary to land or evacuate troops in the face of opposition it should be  rembered  that considerable naval gunfire support can be provided at short notice. 

POSSIBLE  USE OF LANDING CRAFT.

6.       The following are a few of the easily imagined situations in which landing craft would be useful or essential.  There are obviously many more.

7.      A Communist penetration down the FANNING Road might cut off our troops to the East. If these were to be supplied or reinforced by sea there might be the makings of a decisive battle  whereas, we might lose all the troops.  

8.      If the battle were going according to plan it would be an advantage to supply troops by sea in order to take pressure off the roads.  In some localities there are no roads in any case. 

9.      Along range penetration cut the CANTO  -  HONG KONG Road might and railway starting by Landing troops in Chinese territory, might be possible and desirable.

CRAFT. 

10.    It is understood that enough craft are maintained in the UNITED KINGDOM to lift a Brigade Group..  Many of those are manned (By Royal Marines) and used for training.  It should be possible to ship them out with there crews and maintenance facilities at reasonably short notice.

NUMBERS AND TYPE.

11.  The Army would have to ask for what it wanted, but at a guess enough craft to lift a battalion, with some spares, would be sufficient. That would mean between 20 and 30 L.C.A. backed up with a smaller number of L.C.M. for tanks, vehicles and stores. A second flight could of course be taken to the beaches in ships.

12.  Medium sized craft such as L.C.T. are not advised as they would take to long to make the Passage and the L.S.T. would hardly be necessary owing to the short distances involved. It might, however, well prove to be most efficient to ship small craft out in L.S.T. which might then come in useful.

MANNING AND MAINTENANCE.

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